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Abstract 
In the absence of any correlation between wealth and entrepreneurial talent, initial net 
wealth should have an explanatory power in the decision to become an entrepreneur only for 
households that are financially constrained; further, its importance should decrease with 
wealth. I test these theoretical predictions for the Italian case, using the Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth. The evidence is that household's initial wealth is indeed important in the 
decision to become an entrepreneur and its effect is lower for the richest households. When 
net wealth is instrumented, the results are similar. Furthermore, the effect of net wealth is 
stronger when legal enforcement of the loan contract is weaker, as also predicted by the 
model. Finally, conditional on becoming entrepreneurs, initial household wealth does not 
significantly affect the size of the business. In summary, it seems that imperfections in 
capital markets can induce people to accumulate assets in order to facilitate the decision to 
become entrepreneurs. 
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* Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department. E-mail: silvia.magri@bancaditalia.it.    1 Introduction1
Entrepreneurs hold a high share of total net wealth. This evidence is widely documented in the
United States (Quadrini, 1999; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004) and is true in Italy as well (Table 1a).
There are two main explanations for this evidence. Being an entrepreneur can be at the origin of an
increasing wealth. On the other hand, higher initial wealth may facilitate the decision to become
an entrepreneur.
The aim of this paper is to study the potential connection between household's initial wealth and
entrepreneurship in Italy and to dwell on its related explanations. Why should initial net wealth be
linked to the probability of becoming an entrepreneur? Theoretical models of occupational choices
predict that if net wealth and entrepreneurial ability were not correlated and capital markets were
perfect, initial net wealth should not be linked to the decision of becoming an entrepreneur (Section
2). On the contrary, when the would-be entrepreneurs face some imperfections in capital markets,
in the form of ¯nancial constraints, and the initial capital requirements are not trivial, we should
observe a link between initial net wealth and the entrepreneurial income. As a consequence, the
probability of becoming an entrepreneur is also correlated with household initial wealth.
The theoretical framework for this debate is quite old. The theory developed by Knight at the
onset of the past century (Le Roy and Singell, 1987) supports the view that people need to be
wealthy before starting a business. The high uncertainty correlated with entrepreneurial activity
causes market failures in providing the entrepreneurs with all the money they require. Therefore
the entrepreneur also needs to be a capitalist. On the contrary, according to Schumpeter (1934),
the entrepreneur and the capitalist have two distinct functions. Therefore, Schumpeter focuses on
the entrepreneurial ability as the main prerequisite to become an entrepreneur, rather than on the
low risk aversion, more emphasized by Knight.
From an empirical perspective, several contributions ¯nd evidence that net wealth is important
in determining entrepreneurial income and the probability of becoming an entrepreneur (Evans
and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Fairlie, 1999; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004). This
is also true when the endogeneity problem of household wealth is tackled, generally by using in-
heritances as instruments for wealth or directly in the estimation as a more exogenous substitute
1I would like to thank for their helpful comments Riccardo De Bonis, Mariacristina De Nardi, Giorgio Gobbi,
Enrichetta Ravina, Luigi Federico Signorini, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the 10th Annual
Meeting of Lacea (Paris, October 2005), the 17th SED Conference (Vancouver, July 2006) and the 22th EEA Con-
ference (Budapest, August 2007). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
re°ect those of the Bank of Italy.
5(Holtz-Eakin, Jou°ain and Rosen, 1994a; Holtz-Eakin, Jou°ain and Rosen, 1994b; Blanch°ower
and Oswald, 1998). Even in the United States and in the United Kingdom, ¯nancial constraints
seem therefore to a®ect the birth of sole proprietorship. However, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) cast
some doubts on this evidence. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they ¯nd that in the
US the relationship between initial net wealth and the entry into entrepreneurship is °at for most
of the wealth distribution; this relationship becomes positive and signi¯cant only at the top of
the wealth distribution. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) argue that their ¯ndings are at odds with an
explanation based on ¯nancial constraints. Even if some constraints exist, they do not appear to be
empirically important in deterring the birth of most US businesses, probably because the capital
required for starting a business is generally small2 and loans are widespread among entrepreneurs.
In order to speci¯cally explain their results, the authors notice that very wealthy households are
more likely to have lower risk aversion and are therefore more willing to bear the high uncertainty
that entrepreneurial activity entails; hence, wealth is likely to capture the e®ect of risk aversion,
which is unobserved.
Actually, the main problem of the theoretical models analyzing the occupational choice of be-
coming an entrepreneur is that their implications are obtained assuming no correlation between net
wealth and entrepreneurial talent; a similar consideration also holds for risk aversion, which is not
even considered in these models that often assume risk neutrality. Because both entrepreneurial
talent and risk aversion are often unobserved, a shock in these unobserved factors might in°uence
both the decision of becoming an entrepreneur and net wealth. In this case, one can ¯nd a spurious
correlation between net wealth and entrepreneurship, which is actually driven by a third unob-
served factor, i.e. entrepreneurial talent and/or risk aversion. This is a very general problem that
might spring from the endogeneity of net wealth.
In this paper I try to improve on this speci¯c point. First, the Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) contains information that allows us to measure both entrepreneurial ability and
risk aversion. Secondly, I also tackle the endogeneity problems by using some new instruments for
net wealth, such as the size and the category of the house of residence.
Other contributions of the paper are the following. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) verify the existence
of a non-linear impact of wealth on the decision to become an entrepreneur both by allowing a
possible shift in the intercept, for di®erent levels of household wealth, and a change in the slope,
2On this point see also Meyer (1990). However Gentry and Hubbard (2004) share a di®erent view. They compare
median household wealth and median entrepreneurial equity stake and conclude that most households do require
external ¯nancing to start a business. They argue that costly external ¯nancing may play a role in entry into
entrepreneurship at all levels of wealth.
6by introducing a polynomial in wealth (5 terms). In order to assess whether initial net wealth has
a greater impact on the poorest households, rather than using a speci¯c function (polynomial),
this paper relies on a more °exible model, by allowing the coe±cients of initial net wealth to be
di®erent for households belonging to the four di®erent quartiles of the initial net wealth distribution.
Furthermore, as a new feature of the model developed in Section 2, the borrowing constraint is
linked to the enforcement costs of the loan contract. This permits us to obtain and test a prediction
that household wealth is more important when enforcement costs are higher. To test this prediction,
which also helps us to understand the way in which household wealth a®ects the decision to become
an entrepreneur, regional data on the legal enforcement of the loan contract are used. Beyond these
features, in this paper, unlike Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and more similarly to Gentry and Hubbard
(2004), to test the di®erent impact of the borrowing constraint in capital markets I condition the
de¯nition of entrepreneur on having a positive business value; the initial capital requirement cannot
be trivial.
After controlling for learning entrepreneurial ability from one's own parents, the results are that
initial net wealth is important in explaining the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. More
interestingly, the importance of net wealth is lower for the richest households, as predicted by the
model. When either using other controls for learning entrepreneurial ability or including a proxy
for risk aversion, which considerably reduces the number of observations, the evidence is similar.
The results also hold when household wealth is instrumented. As expected, net wealth is also more
important for those households that live in regions with worse legal enforcement and for people who
are rationed in the credit market. However, conditional on becoming an entrepreneur, net wealth
actually has no e®ect on the size of the business; this is a new result given the data limitations
encountered by previous empirical analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, a simple theoretical model is developed to help to
¯x the idea about the predictions tested in the subsequent part of the paper. Section 3 presents the
data, the variables and the estimation method used to test the predictions. Section 4 reports the
results of the estimation aimed at shedding light on the link between household initial net wealth
and the decision to become an entrepreneur. Sections 5 and 6 present respectively some extensions
of the analysis and alternative speci¯cations. Section 7 shows the results of the estimation on the
link between initial net wealth and business size. Section 8 concludes with some ¯nal remarks.
72 A model of entrepreneurial selection with incomplete enforce-
ment
To ¯x the ideas on the theoretical predictions tested in this paper, I rely on a simple one-period
model, similar to the one developed in Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a);
risk neutrality is assumed.3 I add a few features. First, entrepreneurs can default.4 Further, there
is limited enforceability of the loan contract in the case of the borrower's default, which is actually
at the origin of the credit constraint (Caggetti and De Nardi, 2006). These changes in the model
permit us to obtain a prediction, based on the interaction between household initial wealth and
legal enforcement, which helps in interpreting the results of the paper.
In this static model of occupational choice, the household is the unit of the analysis, principally
because net wealth is measured at family level; moreover, the business is frequently a family busi-
ness, where all or most of the members of the household work in the same ¯rm. The household
compares the income that can be obtained earning a wage with entrepreneurial income and then
selects the occupation. For the wage earner the income is given by





i.e. wage income depends on the previous experience as a wage worker x1, on the education x2
and on a constant ¹; ´ is a disturbance that is i.i.d.(1;¾2
´)
Entrepreneurial income is represented in the following way:
Y e = µk®² (2)
and it depends on entrepreneurial talent µ and on the capital invested in the production function
k; ® 2 (0;1) and ² is a normal disturbance (1;¾2
²), whose distribution is independent across workers.
First, I obtain the optimal capital for the entrepreneur, i.e. the capital maximising the expected
value of the net entrepreneurial income (expectations are taken over ²)
max
k
Efµk®² + r(A ¡ k)g (3)
3In both these models the imperfection in the capital market takes the form of a quantity constraint. In the model
developed in Gentry and Hubbard (2004), capital market imperfection takes the form of a premium cost on external
¯nance.
4Evans and Jovanovic (1989) argue that if people are limited in the amount they can borrow, it is not unreasonable
to assume they will not default.
8where A is the household wealth endowment and r is the interest rate at which the household
can either lend and borrow in the credit market.
The optimal capital for the unconstrained household equals the marginal product of the capital








However, in the credit market there is a constraint on the maximum amount the bank is willing
to lend to the borrower. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show how credit rationing can exist even in a
world in which all agents are optimising, but there is adverse selection and moral hazard problems
arising from the existence of asymmetric information.5 Speci¯cally, in the model developed in this
section, borrowing constraints stem from the assumptions that contracts are imperfectly enforceable
(Caggetti and De Nardi, 2006). If the loan contract is not fully enforceable, lenders cannot force
the debtors to entirely repay their loans. Therefore, borrowers will fully repay their loans only
if it is in their own interest to do so. Since both lenders and borrowers are aware of this, the
lender will only lend an amount, possibly equal to zero, which will be in the borrower's interest to
repay as promised. In this model, the amount of the loan granted by the lender depends positively
on household wealth A, which can be pledged as collateral: the higher the amount of household
wealth A, the larger the sum that the bank is able to recover in the case of default, the lower the
borrower's incentive to default and the larger the quantity of money that the bank is willing to
lend. The amount of the loan is also positively linked to the degree of enforceability of the loan
contract (Caggetti and De Nardi, 2006).
The amount of the loan granted by the bank is consequently equal to
¸ = ¸(A;J) (5)
and is positively linked to household wealth A and to the enforcement of the loan contract J
(¸A > 0 and ¸J > 0). If ¸ = 0 the household is completely rationed in the credit market, while if
¸ = 1 there is no imperfection in the capital market. The following other assumptions on ¸ are
supposed to hold: ¸AA < 0 and ¸AJ < 0. The third assumption ¸AA < 0 implies that the positive
5In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the borrowing constraint takes the form of a quantity constraint rather than an
increase in the borrowing interest rate, because the bank return does not monotonically increase with the price of
the loan. Banks may rationally avoid ¯nding an equilibrium on the credit market through the interest rate, because
an increase in the price of the credit might attract the riskiest customers (adverse selection) or induce customers to
choose the projects with the greatest return variability (moral hazard).
9marginal e®ect of net wealth on the amount of the loan decreases with net wealth: for low-asset
households, an increase in the amount of wealth that can be invested in the business has a positive
strong impact on the lender's attitude because the latter can partly seize the collateral in the case
of default; for the very wealthy households, collateral is already there and in any case they are
less likely to need a loan as they can ¯nance entrepreneurial activity with their own wealth. The
fourth assumption ¸AJ < 0 states that when legal enforcement J improves, so that the fraction of
money that a lender can recover from the collateral increases, lenders can ask for a lower amount
of collateral; therefore the link between collateral and the size of the loan is less strong. In this
case collateral and enforcement are substitutes.
Hence, for a household that is ¯nancially constrained in the credit market, the maximum amount
entrepreneurs are able to invest is equal to their wealth plus the loan:
k¤ = A + ¸(A;J) (6)
In summary, in this model the optimal capital that entrepreneurs can invest in their production










The ¯rst amount is the optimal capital for households that are not ¯nancially constrained, while
the second is for constrained households. The ¯rst implication of this model is that for households
that are not credit constrained, the optimal capital is not a®ected by net wealth. The optimal
capital increases with net wealth only for households that are ¯nancially constrained.
Further, as the optimal capital for unconstrained household increases with entrepreneurial ability








then the household is never constrained. The amount required for the optimal capital is covered
by the household's endowment of money and loans.
Including the optimal capital in the production function (2), I obtain the expected entrepreneurial















Given entrepreneurial ability or, in other words, controlling for entrepreneurial ability µ, the
partial derivatives of entrepreneurial income with respect to household net wealth for unconstrained






µ®[A + ¸(A;J)]®¡1(1 + ¸A)
(10)
Therefore, the ¯rst prediction of this model is that household initial net wealth can in°uence
entrepreneurial income, through the optimal capital, only for ¯nancially constrained households.
Further, for constrained households, increasing net wealth has a decreasing positive impact on
entrepreneurial earnings:
@2Y
@A2j¹ µ = µ®f(® ¡ 1)[A + ¸(A;J)]®¡2(1 + ¸A)2 + ¸AA[A + ¸(A;J)]®¡1g (11)
This second derivative has a negative sign because the ¯rst term is negative (® < 1) as is the
second because ¸AA < 0 by assumption, i.e. as net wealth increases, the importance of an increase
in the net wealth for the amount of the loan decreases.6
After determining the expected entrepreneurial income in the two positions (unconstrained and
constrained), a household selects its occupation by comparing wage with entrepreneurial income.
The household knows its own ability µ 7 and chooses to start a business if and only if its expected
net entrepreneurial income is greater than wage earnings




2 + rA (12)
For unconstrained households, I substitute the optimal capital into (12) and I get (see Appendix,
6This is also true if ¸AA = 0, i.e. if there is a linear relationship between the loan and household wealth. Vice
versa, should ¸AA be positive, this second derivative could have an ambiguous sign and increasing net wealth could
have an increasing positive e®ect on entrepreneurial income and then on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur.
The empirical results give insights on this point.
7The ability is observed. This assumption allows us to ignore problems arising from partial observability; it is also
adopted in Caggetti and De Nardi (2006) and in Evans and Jovanovic (1989).















[A + ¸(A;J)]1¡® (12a)
An unconstrained household, for which the RHS inequality holds (see 8), will choose to become
an entrepreneur if the LHS inequality also holds, i.e. if its ability is above a minimum value. Below
this value, the household decides to be a wage earner. The LHS of the selection equation does not
depend on household net wealth.
For constrained households, substituting the optimal capital in (12), I get (see the Appendix









2 [A + ¸(A;J)]¡® + r[A + ¸(A;J)]1¡®
¸
(12b)
As the household is ¯nancially constrained, the ¯rst term comes from (8) with the opposite sign;
the second term marks the ability level required to become an entrepreneur rather than a wage
earner. The constrained household will choose to become an entrepreneur if its ability is greater
than the maximum of these two values.
Let S2 stand for the ¯rst term and S3 for the second term between the squared brackets in the
inequality (12b). Should S2 ¸ S3, the ability required to select as an entrepreneur (S3) is actually
lower that the level above which the household is ¯nancially constrained (S2); the situation is
therefore analogous to the one presented in (12a) and the household is actually unconstrained in
the credit market. Therefore, for the truly constrained households, the ability required to select as
an entrepreneur (S3) is higher than (S2) (S3 > S2). This marginal entrepreneur is investing less







2 (¡®)[A + ¸(A;J)]¡®¡1(1 + ¸A) + r(1 ¡ ®)[A + ¸(A;J)]¡®(1 + ¸A) < 0 (13)
i.e. an increase in net wealth reduces S3 and therefore widens the acceptance region into
entrepreneurship (see the Appendix point 3 for details). Unlike the unconstrained households, for
which the selection equation does not depend on wealth (LHS in 12a), for constrained households,
the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is positively correlated with household initial wealth.
I ¯nally try some comparative static by using changes in the level of legal enforcement. What
happens to the impact of net wealth on entrepreneurial income when legal enforcement J improves?
12The appropriate second derivative is:
@2Y
@A@J
j¹ µ = µ®f(® ¡ 1)[A + ¸(A;J)]®¡2¸J(1 + ¸A) + ¸JA[A + ¸(A;J)]®¡1g (14)
This cross partial derivative is negative as the ¯rst term is negative because ® < 1 and the second
term is also negative because ¸JA is negative by assumption (stronger legal enforcement reduces
the importance of collateral for the bank, i.e. collateral and enforcement are substitutes). Hence, as
enforcement improves (J increases), the positive marginal impact of net wealth on entrepreneurial
income decreases; when enforcement worsens (J decreases), the impact of net wealth is stronger. As
pointed out in other studies (Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano, 2005; Bertola and Koeniger, 2004), when
enforcement is low, lenders are more selective in granting credit. Therefore, either the household
cannot obtain the loan or the loan granted is more closely related to its initial net wealth. In
both cases, initial household wealth has a greater role in explaining the decision to become an
entrepreneur.8
In summary, the three predictions of this model, which are tested in the next sections, are the
following.
1. The ¯rst prediction is that household initial net wealth should in°uence the selection as
entrepreneurs only for liquidity constrained households. In a perfect capital market and if
entrepreneurial ability is observed, the initial net wealth of potential entrants should not
a®ect the selection decision.
2. The second prediction is that the second derivative of entrepreneurial income with respect
to net wealth is negative. Therefore the increase in entrepreneurial income determined by a
rise in net wealth is decreasing as net wealth increases, i.e. when households become richer.
Loosely speaking, the impact of net wealth on income, and consequently on the probability
of becoming an entrepreneur, should be stronger when net wealth is lower.
3. The third prediction is that when the degree of legal enforcement increases, the importance
of an increase in net wealth for entrepreneurial income and for the probability of becoming
an entrepreneur should be lower.
8The cross-derivative is negative also if ¸JA = 0. Vice versa, should ¸JA be positive (collateral and legal enforce-
ment are complements and not substitutes), this cross-derivative would have an ambiguous sign. It would be possible
to ¯nd that as enforcement improves, household wealth becomes more important in in°uencing entrepreneurial income
and therefore the selection into entrepreneurship. The empirical results give insights on this point.
13It is important to stress that these predictions hold only if entrepreneurial ability and net wealth
are not correlated, or in other words, if ability is observed. When the assumption of zero correlation
between net wealth A and entrepreneurial ability µ does not hold, these conclusions are no longer
true only for ¯nancially constrained households. In this case, there could be a correlation between
net wealth and entrepreneurial income driven by a third unobserved factor. For instance, if there is
a positive correlation between unobserved entrepreneurial ability and net wealth, a positive shock in
ability will increase entrepreneurial income. At the same time, because of the positive correlation
with ability, net wealth increases, for instance because more talented people accumulate more
wealth. You therefore observe an increase in entrepreneurial earnings associated with an increase
in net wealth. However, the second is not causing the ¯rst. A similar remark also holds for risk
aversion, which is not even considered in the model that, as many other models, assumes risk
neutrality.
In order to test empirically the theoretical predictions of the model developed in this section it
is therefore essential to include in the estimations some proxies for entrepreneurial ability and risk
aversion. This allows us to verify the impact of net wealth given entrepreneurial ability and risk
aversion.
3 Data description and the estimation strategy
In this paper I use several waves of the biannual Survey of Household Income and Wealth from
1989 to 2002. The Survey contains information on household social, demographic and economic
characteristics; data on net wealth and entrepreneurial business are also provided.9
3.1 The de¯nition of entrepreneur
In this analysis the de¯nition of entrepreneur is crucial. In the SHIW, wage earners are those workers
who identify themselves as working for someone else. On the contrary, self-employed people work
for themselves. The category of the self-employed is quite wide, including a) members of the arts
and professions, b) sole proprietors, c) free-lancers, d) owners or members of a family business, e)
active shareholders and partners, f) contingent workers. A household having a member in one of
these categories could be de¯ned as an entrepreneur (entre1). However, given the focus on access to
capital and on the relevance of initial wealth, in this paper the preferred de¯nition of entrepreneur
9For more details on the SHIW see http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait and for a comparison
between the SHIW, National Accounts and Financial Accounts see the Methodological Notes in Supplements to the
Statistical Bulletin (2008).
14is that considering households that de¯ne themselves as self-employed and also declare a positive
business value (entre2).10 It is fruitful to concentrate on households with positive business values
in order to isolate the self-employed who make signi¯cant up-front investments in their business
(Caggetti and De Nardi, 2006; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004). In order to check for the existence of
¯nancial constraints, initial capital requirements need to be non-trivial.11
Table 1a reports the percentage of households that are entrepreneurs according to both the
above-mentioned de¯nitions. For robustness, I also use two other de¯nitions of entrepreneurs:
the ¯rst excludes members of the arts and professions (entre3); the second excludes members of
the arts and professions and requires a positive business value (entre4). According to the entre1
de¯nition, roughly one fourth of the households in the sample, obtained pooling the 1989-2002
waves of the SHIW, are entrepreneurs; around 39 per cent when considering only working age (18-
65) households. On the basis of the entre2 de¯nition these percentages decrease respectively to 16
per cent and 26 per cent for the working age (18-65) households. As in the United States, regardless
of the de¯nition, Italian entrepreneurs hold a high share of total net wealth. The concentration of
wealth is the highest in the last quartile of net wealth, but is also not negligible in the ¯rst quartile
(Table 1b).
3.2 The sample of new small entrepreneurs
Similarly to what has been done in other empirical papers (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004), I analyse a
sample of households that are in two consecutive waves of the SHIW and are not entrepreneurs in
the ¯rst period considered. I de¯ne a new entrepreneur as a household that becomes an entrepreneur
in the subsequent period. Retirees and people aged less than 18 or more than 65 are excluded from
the analysis; unemployed people are included. In order to increase the number of observations, I
pool all the samples obtained by considering pairs of di®erent waves of the SHIW (1989-91, 1991-93,
1993-95, 1995-98, 1998-2000, 2000-02). Our ¯nal sample is made up of more than 8,000 observations
10In detail, I use the business value of the ¯rm declared in the survey that is equal to the value of the assets, such
as equipment and goodwill excluding the buildings used in the business, plus the value of business equity for the
active shareholders and partners.
11In the SHIW, around one third of the entrepreneurs de¯ned as in entre1 have a business value equal to 0 (compare
with entre2 in Table 1a). Hurst and Lusardi (2004) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US
and focus on households that report owning at least one business; therefore they de¯ne entrepreneurs as business
owners, including professionals. However, they stress that 30 per cent of business owners report zero business equity
(i.e. business assets-business loans; the PSID does not separately record the assets and the liabilities of households'
business). Gentry and Hubbard (2004) analyse the households who own at least $5000 in actively managed business.
Caggetti and De Nardi (2006) classify as entrepreneurs the households that declare that they are self-employed, own
a business and have an active management role in it; by taking this intersection, they claim that their de¯nition is
likely to eliminate the self-employed that mostly invest in human capital, but very little in physical capital.
15(Table 2). The weighted percentage of households that become entrepreneurs in the pooled sample
is equal to 8:5 per cent for the entre2 de¯nition of entrepreneur, which is the one considered in the
analysis.12
3.3 The explanatory variables
As stated above, the unit of analysis is the household. If the head is self-employed, his personal
characteristics are used in the estimation. On the contrary, if the head of the household is not
self-employed, the characteristics of the other member of the household declared as self-employed
are considered; generally, this is the spouse, less frequently a son or daughter. Household net wealth
is measured as the sum of real and ¯nancial assets after subtracting liabilities; this is household
net wealth before becoming an entrepreneur. In the estimation, I also include household labour
income; this variable should control for any income e®ect in occupational choice.
In order to control for entrepreneurial ability µ, I include the possibility of informal learning and
training that occur when growing up in a family business (Lentz and Laband, 1990; Holtz-Eakin
et al., 1994a; Guiso and Schivardi, 2005). In detail, I use a dummy equal to 1 if one of the parents,
either of the head or of the spouse, was self-employed; this is the speci¯cation called model 1 in
Tables 3 and 4. As this ¯rst indicator can also capture the possibility of inheritance of a business,
I use another measure of informal acquisition of the human capital required to run a business: I
include a dummy equal to one if the household lives in an Italian industrial district (model 2 in
Tables 3 and 4).13 These industrial districts are areas de¯ned by the presence of small-medium
manufacturing ¯rms, involved in the production of homogeneous products and coordinating their
activity at various stages of the production process.14 The idea is that in these areas it is easier to
learn entrepreneurial ability.15
12Hurst and Lusardi (2004) consider a sample including all households in the PSID between the ages of 22 and
60 that did not own a business in either 1989 or 1994 and subsequently remain in the PSID for one additional year.
Their total sample has 7,645 observations and the weighted percentage of households that become business owners
in the subsequent year is 4.5 per cent.
13However, not many family business are inherited. Using data from the SHIW in 1991, which had a speci¯c section
on this topic, roughly 20 per cent of family businesses were inherited. This share is higher than that calculated for the
US, where very few businesses were inherited: Fairlie and Robb (2007) ¯nd that only 1.6 per cent of small businesses
in the Characteristics of Business Owners Survey were inherited; slightly larger shares are obtained from the Federal
Reserve's Survey of Small Business Finances (4 per cent) and the Survey of Consumer Finance (3.5 per cent); Lentz
and Laband (1990) ¯nd that from a sample of larger independent businesses the share is higher at 14.2 per cent.
14Industrial districts are de¯ned by the Italian Statistical O±ce (Istat); they amount to around 200. In order to
maximize the sample size, in this model 2 I also drop the dummy for graduate parents that is never signi¯cant and
is available for fewer observations.
15On similar lines, Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) use a dummy equal to 1 if the person knows someone who started
a business in the recent past to capture what they call in°uences by social network.
16To capture risk aversion, I include a measure of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion,
as calculated in Guiso and Paiella (2003); this measure is available for a smaller sample (model 3 in
Tables 3 and 4).16 Despite the extent of non-response and the measurement error, this risk attitude
indicator should capture individual willingness to bear risk. Speci¯cally, Guiso and Paiella (2004)
¯nd that di®erences in the degree of risk aversion seem to explain sorting into riskier occupations
such as being self-employed.
As control variables, I include several household characteristics that may in°uence the shape of
the household utility function and its occupational choice. First, age is a measure of the attitude
toward risk: individuals will try a riskier occupation, such as becoming an entrepreneur, when
they are younger; age may also be an indicator of individual experience in the labour market.
I also include two demographic controls for marital status and the number of children. Having
to support a family can make people less willing to take the higher income risk associated with
entrepreneurship; on the other hand, a family may support the business activity. Finally, I take
into account in the estimation a dummy for education, also for parents' education, gender and the
status of unemployed. In all estimations I control for business cycles with year dummies; ¯xed
e®ects for the 20 Italian regions are also included.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables for the whole sample used
in the estimations and the two sub-samples of households that become entrepreneurs or remain
wage earners in the subsequent period. All the nominal variables are expressed at 1995 prices. The
most signi¯cant di®erences between the two sub-samples refer to having self-employed parents, the
number of children, the unemployed status, household labour income and its initial net wealth.
When considering the self-employment and education dummy for parents (model 1), the sample
decreases to roughly 7,000 observations as the variables referring to the parents are available only
from 1991. As for the proxy for absolute risk aversion (model 3), this is available only for an
even smaller sample of around 2,000 observations. The general characteristics of the households,
as reported in Table 2, are not biased by the di®erent size and periods of the samples considered
in the estimations.
16The wording of the question is: \You are o®ered the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the
same probability, either to gain 5,165 euros or to lose all the capital invested. What is the most you are prepared to
pay for this security?".
174 The probability of becoming an entrepreneur and initial house-
hold wealth
This section is aimed at explaining the results concerning the probability of becoming an en-
trepreneur. Given the theoretical predictions of the model sketched in Section 2, the focus of the
empirical exercise consists in verifying the explanatory power of initial household wealth in period t
on household occupational decision in the following period t+1, after controlling for some relevant
characteristics. Table 3 contains the results obtained with linear net wealth. Table 4 includes
the results when the coe±cient of net wealth is allowed to change for households belonging to the
di®erent quartiles of net wealth distribution.17
When considering model 1 (6,846 observations), as in many other studies referring mainly to the
US and the UK, household initial net wealth has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect (Table 3, column
2). On the grounds of the theoretical model presented in Section 2, this result is traditionally
interpreted as evidence of ¯nancial constraints. The economic impact is not trivial: by increasing
net wealth by 100,000 euros, an admittedly strong increase compared to the average value of net
wealth for the whole sample (Table 2), but also equal to one standard deviation of net wealth in the
sample, the estimated probability of becoming an entrepreneur increases by 1.4 percentage points,
i,e, by more than 20 per cent of the estimated probability (6.8 per cent).18 When moving from
the ¯rst quartile (12,000 euros) to the third quartile (147,000 euros) of net wealth distribution, the
probability of becoming an entrepreneur increases by 2 percentage points (from 5.6 to 7.5 per cent).
To test the second prediction of the model in Section 2, that the importance of net wealth in
alleviating liquidity constraints should be lower for the richest households, I allow the coe±cient of
net wealth to be di®erent for households belonging to the four quartiles of net wealth distribution.
In the second column of Table 4 (model 1), consistently with this prediction, the marginal e®ect
of net wealth decreased as we go through higher quartiles of net wealth. More speci¯cally, the
coe±cient of net wealth is the highest in the ¯rst quartile, though very imprecisely estimated.
It is signi¯cant in the other quartiles and reaches its lowest value for the richest households, i.e.
third and fourth quartiles of wealth. A Wald test, at the bottom of the table, shows that the
coe±cient in the second quartile is signi¯cantly di®erent from the coe±cients in the third and
17In all the estimations, I drop the observations for which household labour income and net wealth are lower than
the 1st percentile and higher than the 99th percentile.
18In Hurst and Lusardi (2004), when net wealth increases by $100;000, the probability of becoming an entrepreneur
increases from 4.5 to 5 per cent; the corresponding marginal e®ect is hence equal to an increase by roughly 10 per
cent.
18fourth quartiles. As for the economic impact, when initial net wealth increases by 100,000 euros
for the households in the second quartile of net wealth, the estimated probability of becoming an
entrepreneur increases by 8 p.p. (at more than twice as much as the average estimated probability);
the same probability increases by 2.7 and 1.9 p.p. respectively for households in the third and fourth
quartiles of wealth.19 The evidence is con¯rmed when similar unreported estimations are run on
sub-samples of households belonging to di®erent quartiles of net wealth, instead of using interaction
terms as before: the estimation by samples split is more °exible as all the variables are allowed
to have di®erent coe±cients in the di®erent sub-samples. Furthermore, when the sample is split
into just two groups, by using the median wealth, the marginal e®ect of net wealth is signi¯cantly
higher (5 p.p.) for households whose wealth is lower than the median.20
The absence of a signi¯cant e®ect of initial wealth for the poorest households can be partly
rationalized in this way. As argued by Fairlie (1999), for the poorest households an increase in net
wealth would not be enough to make lenders willing to consider the household's loan application:
small increases in their assets cannot be used to borrow substantially more money for start-up capi-
tal. Bester (1987) uses similar arguments: in his model of credit market with imperfect information,
lenders may use collateral either to sort borrowers of di®erent risk or as an incentive mechanism,
because higher collateral forces borrowers to choose less risky projects. Exclusion from the credit
market can occur if the borrowers' wealth that can be used as collateral is too small to allow perfect
sorting or to create su±ciently strong incentives. Therefore, there may be a threshold (the ¯rst
quartile of initial wealth in our sample is equal to 12,000 euros) under which initial wealth is too
small to in°uence the lender's decision and hence the probability of becoming an entrepreneur.
As for the other household characteristics, it is worth stressing that the measure of entrepreneurial
ability is highly signi¯cant (Table 3). The likelihood of transition into entrepreneurship is higher
when one of the parents was self-employed: it increases by 3.9 percentage points, roughly half of
the estimated probability (6.8 per cent). Further results are the following. An increase in the num-
ber of children (aged under 18) decreases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur, probably
because of the need of a more stable income to support a family. The relationship between the
probability of becoming an entrepreneur and age is U-shaped: the probability decreases for most
of the age distribution, up to the age of 50, which is the 75 percentile.21 This result is partly
19The second quartile of net wealth is between 12,000 and 75,000 euros; the third quartile is between 75,000 and
147,000 euros; the fourth quartile is between 147,000 and 642,000 euros. Data are expressed in 1995 prices.
20When the coe±cient of net wealth is allowed to be di®erent for households belonging to di®erent deciles of wealth,
the coe±cient of net wealth still decreases as we move towards the richest households.
21In Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994b) the probability of becoming entrepreneur similarly decreases with age.
19consistent with the interpretation that becoming an entrepreneur increases the income risk; this
decision is therefore more likely to be taken when people are young. People who attain a higher
level of education are less likely to enter entrepreneurship: a dummy for high school education has
a negative coe±cient. The e®ect of education on entrepreneurship in the empirical literature is
rather mixed or weak (Ardagna and Lusardi, 2008; Fairlie, 1999); Johansson (2000) also ¯nds that
in a similar exercise for Finnish households, the coe±cients of the dummy for higher education are
all negative.22
In estimating model 2 (8,176 observations), I control for the possibility of informal acquisition
of the entrepreneurial ability by including a dummy that is equal to 1 if the household lives in
an industrial district. As expected, belonging to an industrial district has a positive e®ect on the
probability of becoming an entrepreneur. The other results in Tables 3 and 4 are very similar
to those commented for model 1. In an unreported estimation I also use as a measure of the
entrepreneurial ability a dummy that is equal to 1 if people had previous experience of being self-
employed. This variable is available since 1998 and therefore the number of observations is strongly
reduced (Table 2). Age and education are no longer signi¯cant; however, for people that already had
experience of self-employment the probability of transition into entrepreneurship greatly increases.
More interestingly, a household's initial net wealth retains its positive and signi¯cant e®ect, but
reduced in magnitude; this e®ect is still lower for the richest households.
In estimating model 3 (2,057 observations), I include a measure of household risk aversion and
the same dummy as in model 1 to control for entrepreneurial ability. In column 4 of Table 3, the
marginal e®ect of absolute risk aversion has the expected negative sign, but is very imprecisely
estimated. Although it is reduced in magnitude, the marginal e®ect of the linear term of net
wealth is still signi¯cant. When allowing the e®ects of net wealth to be di®erent in the four
di®erent quartiles of net wealth (Table 4, column 4), the evidence is still that this e®ect decreases
with wealth. The results for the other variables are similar.
Overall, the evidence in this section is that initial net wealth is important in in°uencing the
selection as an entrepreneur. More interestingly, the marginal e®ect of net wealth decreases as net
wealth grows. Net wealth matters mainly for households belonging to the second quartile of wealth
distribution; its importance is lower for the richest households belonging to the third and fourth
quartiles of wealth. The absence of a signi¯cant e®ect for the poorest households, belonging to the
¯rst quartile of wealth, in principle counters the theoretical predictions of the model, although this
22Johansson (2000) explains this result by saying that higher earning capacity, which is due to a higher educational
level, discourages individuals from choosing the more risky path of self-employment.
20can be explained by the existence of a wealth threshold e®ect.
5 The probability of becoming an entrepreneur: some extensions
5.1 Instrumental variable estimation
In this section I tackle some of the problems that can arise when estimating the probability of
starting a business in the way done in the previous section. First, I consider that net wealth,
even when using its value before the decision to become an entrepreneur, can be endogenous to
the same decision; for instance, people may accumulate assets, foreseeing the future transition into
entrepreneurship. More speci¯cally, as already mentioned in Section 2, endogeneity arises if there
are unobserved household features that are correlated with both net wealth and the household's
propensity to start a business. This paper takes a step forward to avoid this problem, by trying
to measure two of these unobserved features: entrepreneurial ability and risk aversion. However, if
not accurately measured, these household features are included in the error term of the estimation
and this might create an endogeneity problem for net wealth.
To overcome this problem, I follow other empirical papers and I instrument net wealth. The
novelty regards the two instruments used for net wealth: the ¯rst is the size of the primary house
in square meters and the second is the category of the house of residence (6 di®erent categories
from luxury to rural). Results are reported in Table 5, respectively in columns 2 and 3 for the
¯rst instruments and in columns 4 and 5 for the second instrument; I focus on model 1. These
two instruments appear to have power as they have signi¯cant partial e®ects in the ¯rst regression
for household net wealth (see the F test in the last panel of Table 5); therefore, the ¯rst condition
for a valid instrument is satis¯ed. The second condition for a valid instrument is that the variable
chosen as an instrument should not be correlated with the error term in the main equation. Unlike
the ¯rst, this condition in a model with one endogenous variable and one instrument cannot be
empirically tested (Wooldridge, 2002). Frequently, it is an argument from the economic theory that
excludes the correlation. As for our estimation, there appears to be no speci¯c economic reasons
for both the size and the category of the house of residence to autonomously in°uence the decision
to become an entrepreneur, i.e. excluding their indirect e®ect through net wealth. Furthermore, in
some unreported estimations where both instruments are used together, a test of overidentifying
restrictions, which can be used when there are more instruments than endogenous variables, never
rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
The evidence in Table 5 is that the marginal e®ect of instrumented net wealth on the probability
21of becoming an entrepreneur is still signi¯cant and is even higher than before, more than double
when net wealth is introduced in a linear way (columns 2 and 4). The higher coe±cients of
net wealth can be explained by the reduction in the attenuation bias, created by measurement
error in wealth that should decrease when this variable is instrumented (Wooldridge, 2002). From
the estimations that allow the e®ects of net wealth to be di®erent for households belonging to
di®erent quartiles of wealth, it is still clear that the marginal e®ect of net wealth decreases for the
richest households; similarly when observations are split according to the median value of household
wealth (columns 3 and 5). Actually, when using the second instrument that also has power for
the estimation referring to households in the ¯rst quartile of wealth (see the F test), household net
wealth is signi¯cant for the poorest households as well; furthermore, it loses signi¯cance for the
richest households in the third and fourth quartiles of wealth.
Finally, I also try with another very powerful instrument, a dummy for the number of bathrooms
in the house of residence, which has very few chances of in°uencing the decision to become an
entrepreneur. Unfortunately this variable is only available from 1993 and hence for a smaller
sample: however, the unreported results for the whole sample and for the split according to the
median value of household wealth are similar to those previously commented.
5.2 Sample selection
In this section I also consider the fact that selecting only those households that, for each pair of the
SHIW, in the ¯rst period did not have a business may create a sample selection bias. In general, a
household that does not start a business has a higher probability of being present in more than one
year, while a household starting a business will be present only for the year when the decision is
taken. More speci¯cally, if a household is rich and has not yet decided to become an entrepreneur,
it could be that its entrepreneurial talent is very low; this could create a downward bias for the
coe±cient of net wealth referring to the richest households.
In order to tackle this problem, ¯rst I run the same estimation as in model 1 of Table 3 for each
single year, considering therefore only households that are present in two consecutive surveys and
that were not entrepreneurs in the ¯rst period. The result is that net wealth is signi¯cant in almost
every year, excluding for the sample obtained from the period 2000-2002. Furthermore, Table 6
(column 3) reports the results of an estimation where, for the households that are present more
than one year in the sample, I just keep the ¯rst observation available; as a consequence the sample
size is halved (No=3,102 observations). As expected, the marginal e®ect of linear net wealth is
22higher compared to that reported in Table 3 and, as shown in Table 6, is still much lower for the
richest households. Results are also con¯rmed with an estimation where I keep all the observations,
giving them a weight which is equal to the inverse of the number of times the household is present
in the sample and the variance is corrected for the presence of repeated observations. Finally, I also
try an estimation where I keep the households that are present just once in the sample, i.e. not
interviewed again: the number of observations decreases even further and the same results hold.
As a second attempt to tackle this problem, I run the same estimation only for households whose
head is young (i.e. aged more than 18 but less than 40). This sample of households can be thought
of as facing for the ¯rst time a serious occupational choice problem; hence, self-selection should
be less important. Moreover, if liquidity constraints are binding, they should be more severe for
young people, who have less time to accumulate assets. In Table 6 (column 4), results obtained
with model 1 (No=2,090) are similar to the previous ones: the coe±cient of net wealth decreases,
imprecisely estimated for the households in the ¯rst quartile of wealth, but strongly signi¯cant for
those in the second quartile.
5.3 Legal enforcement
In this paragraph I verify the third prediction of the model presented in Section 2. Household initial
net wealth should become less important in in°uencing the selection into entrepreneurship when
legal enforcement of creditors' rights is higher. To test this hypothesis, I interact net wealth in its
quartiles with a measure of the share of loan recovered in the case of a customer's default. This
is an indicator of the quality of legal enforcement: the higher the share of the loan recovered, the
better the enforcement. Italian banks directly provided this measure in a questionnaire referring
to the years 1992 and 1993.23 It is measured at the regional level (20 regions) and has no time
variability; in other words, this is a ranking of the geographical legal enforcement in Italy at the
beginning of the 1990s, which is considered ¯xed over the following years. The results, presented
in Table 6 (column 2), are striking. The prediction is that when the quantity of the loan recovered
in the case of default increases, net wealth should matter less. The evidence strongly conforms
to this prediction. As shown by the coe±cients of net wealth not interacted, net wealth is very
important when the quantity of the loan recovered is equal to zero, especially for the households in
the ¯rst and second quartiles of wealth. The importance of net wealth decreases as the recovered
share increases: all the interaction terms have the expected negative sign.
23The questionnaire was submitted to a representative sample of banks (more than 250 banks representing roughly
90 per cent of total loans). Only mortgage proceedings for insolvency concerning households are considered.
23A possible criticism in using the previous indicator is that the quality of legal enforcement closely
matches Italy's North-South divide and that we are therefore picking up the e®ects of many omitted
variables that characterize this geographical divide. However, this problem does not appear to be so
important. First of all, the indicator used is not so strictly correlated with the North-South divide:
the quantity of the loan recovered in the case of a borrower's default is similar in the North and
the South (respectively 65 and 66 per cent) and lower in the central regions (57 per cent). Besides,
an interaction term between household net wealth and the three area dummies in the period under
analysis shows that the coe±cient of wealth is similar across the three di®erent areas of the country.
Therefore legal enforcement seems to re°ect some peculiar di®erences across regions, speci¯cally
connected to the recovery of the loan in the case of a borrower's default, and not capturing any
omitted variable that a®ects di®erences across areas. Finally, I also run the same estimation as in
Table 6 split for the three di®erent areas of the country and the results hold for households living in
the Centre and the South of Italy, where the legal enforcement indicator shows a higher variability.
5.4 Credit constraints
Finally, I verify whether net wealth is more important for households that de¯ne themselves as credit
constrained. In the SHIW people were asked whether they applied for a loan and whether either
a bank or a ¯nancial company turned them down. I de¯ne as credit constrained those households
whose loan application is rejected or who received only a part of the money requested.24 I estimate
a regression where the coe±cient of initial net wealth is allowed to change between the households
that are borrowing constrained or not. The coe±cient of initial net wealth is expected to be higher
for the ¯rst group of households: this is actually the case and the di®erence is statistically signi¯cant
(Table 6, column 5). Similarly, the coe±cient of initial net wealth is higher for households who
obtained loans from relatives and friends (not reported). This is an important source of ¯nance
for new business and a typical way of accessing capital when there are imperfections in the credit
market. However, the di®erence in the coe±cients is not statistically signi¯cant.
24The questions of the SHIW are the following. 1) "In the year did your household apply to a bank or a ¯nancial
company for a loan or a mortgage?" 2) "Was the application granted in full, in part or rejected?" For the 1991 and
1993 surveys, the choice is only between granted and rejected; households answering \partially rejected" are classi¯ed
as liquidity constrained.
246 Alternative speci¯cations
In this section, I present the evidence obtained with alternative speci¯cations in order to verify the
sensitivity of the results commented on in the previous sections.
First, I verify the sensitivity of previous ¯ndings to an alternative de¯nition of entrepreneurs.
As mentioned in Section 3, in the previous analysis I consider entrepreneurs those households in
which one of the members was self-employed and who declare a positive business value (entre2).
To assess the existence of ¯nancial constraints, initial capital requirements need to be not trivial.
In this paragraph, I change the de¯nition and I consider as entrepreneurs all the households that
have just a member that de¯nes him or herself as self-employed, without requiring a positive value
of the business (entre1). This de¯nition is more similar to the one used in Hurst and Lusardi
(2004). In this case, the evidence is quite di®erent compared to the previous one: net wealth is
more relevant for selecting into entrepreneurship for the richest households, along the same lines
as in Hurst and Lusardi (2004). Speci¯cally, in estimating model 1, the coe±cient of net wealth
increases from the third to the fourth quartiles of net wealth; furthermore, net wealth signi¯cantly
in°uences the probability of becoming an entrepreneur only for the households belonging to the
fourth quartile of net wealth; analogous results are obtained splitting the sample. Similarly, when
instrumented, net wealth is signi¯cant only for the richest households. Therefore, in order to obtain
the previous results for the probability of becoming entrepreneurs, I ¯nd it essential to condition
the analysis on entrepreneurs declaring a business value greater than zero. It is di±cult to talk
about ¯nancial constraints if there are no equipment and goodwill to acquire, as in the case of
one-third of entrepreneurs in the entre1 de¯nition (Table 1a).
In the same direction, I try an estimation of model 1 with the other two de¯nitions of en-
trepreneurs. I exclude the members of the arts and professions and contingent workers, who do
not really manage a business (entre3). For this second de¯nition of entrepreneurs, I also focus on
those households that declare a positive value for their business (entre4). Overall, the results for
the probability of becoming an entrepreneur for model 1, estimated with entre3 and entre4, are
similar to those obtained with entre1 and entre2 respectively.
In all the estimations reported in the previous tables standard errors are corrected for the
possible correlation among observations belonging to the same province, i.e. by controlling for
neighboring e®ects. The main results also hold when standard errors are corrected for considering
that there are repeated observations for the same household in the sample and therefore the errors
may not be independent within the household. A panel estimation is not suitable, because when one
25member of the household becomes an entrepreneur, the household immediately exits the sample;
hence, as mentioned before, in the sample there are repeated observations only for households that
never become entrepreneurs or enter entrepreneurship after several years of being interviewed in
the SHIW.
I subsequently try an estimation of model 1 for the households that are continuously present in
the SHIW respectively for the two periods 1989-1995 and 1995-2002. This estimation is interesting
because it allows us to consider households that were not entrepreneurs in 1989 (1995), became
entrepreneurs or did not in 1991 (1998) and, in the ¯rst case, continue as entrepreneurs in the
following years (No=780 observations). I ¯nd that household wealth has an e®ect in in°uencing
the probability of becoming and continuing as an entrepreneur: this e®ect decreases with wealth
and is signi¯cant only for the households belonging to the second quartile of wealth, in line with
the previous results.
As a robustness test I try another exercise as in Hurst and Lusardi (2004). In the dynamic
model proposed by Buera (2003), the selection into entrepreneurship is in°uenced by accumulating
net wealth in advance of starting a business, rather than by the level of net wealth itself. Hence,
I include in the estimation the change in net wealth in the two years before the transition. In an
unreported estimation, I ¯nd that the e®ect of changes in net wealth is signi¯cant for the households
belonging to all quartiles of wealth; it decreases as we move to the richest households, although the
di®erences are not signi¯cant at conventional levels. Furthermore, changes in net wealth matter for
the transition only if they are greater than the third quartile of the distribution of the changes in
net wealth (i.e. an increase of more than 35,000 euros).25 As mentioned before, this result could be
explained with the idea expressed in Fairlie (1999) that small increases in assets are not su±cient
to borrow substantially more money for start-up ¯rms.
As a ¯nal analysis of the robustness of the results, I try another estimation where I consider
only the personal characteristics of the household head, even if another member of the household
is the entrepreneur. The purpose of this exercise is to attach to the household the characteristics
of the member who is more important from an economic point of view. Results are similar for the
estimation of model 1.
25The median value of the change in net wealth is 3000 euros as most of the values in the ¯rst part of the distribution,
under the median, are negative changes in net wealth.
267 Initial household wealth and the size of the business
This section is aimed at verifying the impact of initial household net wealth on the size of the
business, conditional on becoming an entrepreneur. It could be argued that ¯nancial constraints
do not only hamper the decision to become an entrepreneur, but may also entail the creation of
undersized businesses. Due to data limitations, this issue was seldom explored in previous empirical
papers (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). The SHIW contains two possible measures of the size of the
business: the ¯rst is the number of people employed in the business, while the second is the market
value of the ¯rm, which is the sum of the value that the household is required to assign to equipment
and goodwill, excluding the buildings used in the business, and the share of the market value for
active shareholders and partners. The former is the preferred measure because it is less likely to
be a®ected by measurement error.
As the size of the business can be observed only for people becoming entrepreneurs, a typical
sample selection problem arises, which could bias the results if the correlation between the errors
in the probability model and in the size model is di®erent from zero. In this section, I therefore
estimate a Heckman model, which takes into account the selection issue under the assumption of
normality of the error term in the main estimation; independent estimations of business size only
for people that become entrepreneurs could bias the results. In the Heckman estimation, I use
the following identi¯cation conditions, i.e. exclusion restrictions. I exclude from the estimation of
business size the number of children younger than 18 and the unemployment status, because these
two variables should only play a role in the selection as entrepreneurs, but they should not a®ect
business size.
In Table 7 results are reported both for the speci¯cation with linear wealth and with the co-
e±cient of wealth allowed to change for households in di®erent quartiles of wealth. Due to the
reduction in the number of observations, for the estimation of business size I control for the unob-
served geographical heterogeneity with three area dummies, rather than with 20 regional dummies.
To avoid a further reduction in the number of observations, I present the results obtained with the
estimation of model 2 as de¯ned before, which has the largest sample size; more or less analogous
results hold for models 1 and 3. Overall, the selection equation of the Heckman model gives similar
results to the ones presented in previous sections, which are not reported here.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 present the results for business size measured by the number of
employees in the business, while columns 4 and 5 contain the results for the size measured by
27market value of the business. After dropping some outliers for the dependent variable,26the main
¯nding is that an increase in linear net wealth does not in°uence the size of the business, even
when instrumented (unreported). When the coe±cients of net wealth are allowed to change for
quartiles of net wealth the evidence is fairly similar; however, even in this case the coe±cient of net
wealth decreases with wealth. The main factors in°uencing the size of the business are household
labour income, with a positive sign, and the graduate dummy which has a negative impact on the
number of employees: this may re°ect the role of professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, whose
business size is normally limited to that of their o±ces, which is expected to be smaller compared
with the size of a typical ¯rm; when professionals are excluded (by using the de¯nition entre4), the
negative impact of the graduate dummy vanishes. The value of the business is also higher for male
entrepreneurs.
Overall, the results of this section suggest that once the households have decided to become
entrepreneurs, giving more wealth to them seems to have no impact on the size of the business; if
any, there is an e®ect only for households belonging to the second quartile of wealth. The economic
variable that appears to in°uence the size of the business is household labour income.27
8 Final remarks
The evidence in this paper is in favour of the importance of initial household wealth for starting a
business. Imperfections in ¯nancial markets, at least in the form of the quantity constraint as in
the model analysed in this paper, can therefore induce people to accumulate assets before becoming
and in order to become entrepreneurs. This can partly explain the high concentration of net wealth
among entrepreneurs.
Consistently with the theoretical predictions of the model presented in Section 2, the importance
of net wealth for selecting into entrepreneurship decreases as net wealth grows, i.e. for the richest
households. The impact of net wealth is also stronger both when legal enforcement is lower and for
households whose loan applications have been rejected by banks. However, conditional on becoming
an entrepreneur, net wealth has essentially no impact on the size of the business, which seems more
in°uenced by household labour income.
This evidence is consistent with the fact that debt used for business purposes is not very
26I drop the observations for which the dependent variable is lower than the 1st percentile and higher than 99th
percentile.
27Angelini and Generale (2008) ¯nd that ¯nancial constraints cannot be the main determinant of the evolution
over time of the ¯rm size distribution, especially in ¯nancially developed economies.
28widespread among small Italian entrepreneurs (Magri, 2009). Using data from the SHIW, more
than 60 per cent of new entrepreneurs only use internal ¯nance to run their businesses and only
around a quarter have a bank loan for business purposes. The amount of the loan is also quite
modest. Conditional on being entrepreneurs with positive business value (entre2), the average
value of the business is around 64,000 euros, while the average value of gross bank debt for business
purposes is roughly 6,600 euros, while the median value is zero.
29Appendix
Point 1
Following Evans and Jovanovic (1989), I substitute the optimal capital for unconstrained house-
































































Raising both sides to the power (1 ¡ ®), I get





The LHS inequality in (12a) is then obtained.
Point 2
As for constrained households, I analogously substitute the optimal capital for constrained house-
holds in (7) into the selection equation (12) and I get










2 [A + ¸(A;J)]¡® (a8)
The term in (a8) is the second element in the inequality (12b)
Point 3







2 (¡®)[A + ¸(A;J)]¡®¡1(1 + ¸A) + r(1 ¡ ®)[A + ¸(A;J)]¡®(1 + ¸A) (a9)







You can also write
¡®fS3g[A + ¸(A;J)]¡1(1 + ¸A) + r[A + ¸(A;J)]¡®(1 + ¸A) (a11)
and notice that, because S2 < S3, (a11) is lower than
¡®fS2g[A + ¸(A;J)]¡1(1 + ¸A) + r[A + ¸(A;J)]¡®(1 + ¸A) (a12)







[A + ¸(A;J)]¡1(1 + ¸A) + r[A + ¸(A;J)]¡®(1 + ¸A) (a13)
that is equal to zero.
Therefore (a11) is negative and so is the derivative in (a9). When net wealth increases, S3 is
lower and closer to S2; therefore, the acceptance region to select into entrepreneurship increases
with wealth for constrained households.
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34Tables and ¯gures
Table 1a: Entrepreneurship and wealth concentration
De¯nition of entrepreneurs Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
entrepreneurs working age net wealth held by
entrepreneurs entrepreneurs
Entre1 24.5 38.6 61.5
Entre2 16.2 25.6 48.4
Entre3 19.7 31.1 49.7
Entre4 14.3 22.5 42.7
Table 1b: Entrepreneurship and wealth concentration by wealth distribution
Net wealth Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of net
distribution entrepreneurs working age net wealth held by
entrepreneurs entrepreneurs
Overall 16.2 25.6 48.4
Quartiles
1 quartile 2.5 4.7 9.1
2 quartile 10.5 20.1 20.4
3 quartile 16.3 26.9 27.9
4 quartile 35.4 48.4 58.4
Top part of the distribution
80-90 percentile 22.2 34.4 34.4
90-95 percentile 37.6 50.1 50.3
95-100 percentile 55.5 71.1 75.3
Source: excluding the second column in Table 1a, data refer to working age (18-65) households from the
pooled data of the SHIW 1989-2002 (29,571 observations); sampling weights are used. De¯nition Entre1
applies if one of the member of the household belongs to: a) members of the arts and professions, b) sole
proprietors, c) free-lancers, d) owners or members of a family business, e) active shareholders and partners,
f) contingent workers. Entre2 if Entre1 and the household declares a positive business value. De¯nition
Entre3 is analogous to Entre1 excluding from the de¯nition a) members of the arts and profession and f)
contingent workers. De¯nition Entre4 is like Entre3 and the household declares a positive business value.
Statistics in Table 1b refer to Entre2.
35Table 2: Descriptive statistics
(average values)
Variables Whole sample Staying as wage New p-value of the
earners A entrepreneurs B di®erence
N=8,604 N=7,930 N=674 A-B=0
Becoming an entrepreneur (dummy) 0.085
Value of the business (a) (000 euros) 64.0
Value of the business (b) (000 euros) 54.9
No. of employees 5.2
Age 42.07 42.00 42.81 0.1487
High School (dummy) 0.349 0.352 0.316 0.1762
Graduate (dummy) 0.106 0.102 0.149 0.0101
Unemployed (dummy) 0.036 0.037 0.017 0.0012
Married (dummy) 0.819 0.818 0.829 0.6507
Male (dummy) 0.809 0.805 0.850 0.0312
No. of children 0.976 0.989 0.839 0.0063
H.hld initial net wealth (000 euros) 110.57 104.40 177.00 0.0000
H.hld labor income (000 euros) 18,92 18,71 21.16 0.0001
District (dummy) 0.196 0.192 0.235 0.0941
Self-employed parents (dummy) 0.412 0.397 0.563 0.0000
N=7,479 N=6,869 N=610
Graduate parents (dummy) 0.056 0.052 0.097 0.0078
N=7,240 N=6,644 N=596
Previous self-employed (dummy) 0.276 0.233 0.756 0.0000
N=3,000 N=2,759 N=241
Absolute risk aversion 0.154 0.155 0.147 0.2096
N=2,225 N=2,047 N=178
Source: the sample is obtained considering in pairs di®erent waves of the SHIW (1989-1991 1991-93; 1993-
95; 1995-98; 1998-00; 2000-2002). H.hld means household. All households that in the ¯rst period are not
entrepreneurs according to the de¯nition Entre2 are considered in the whole sample, pooled together. Those
staying as wage earners do not become entrepreneurs in the second period. New entrepreneurs become
entrepreneurs in the second period. The statistics refer to the whole sample, before any cleaning for the
estimations; the variables reported in the last rows are missing in some surveys (used in model 1 and model 3
of Tables 3 and 4). Data are weighted using SHIW sampling weights. All the nominal variables are expressed
at 1995 prices. In the column for new entrepreneurs there are indications for two measures of the business
size used in Section 7; the value of the business includes (a) and excludes (b) the value of the ¯rm for active
shareholders and partners.
36Table 3: The probability of starting a business: linear net wealth
(pooled probit estimation - marginal e®ects)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age -.0102 *** -.0085 *** -.0031
(.0033) (.0027) (.0047)
Age squared .0001 *** .0001 *** .0000
(.0000) (.0000) (.0001)
High school - dummy -.0197 *** -.0166 ** -.0188 *
(.0075) (.0067) (.0095)
Graduate - dummy -.0051 .0008 -.0087
(.0113) (.0109) (.0155)
Unemployed - dummy -.0161 -.0213 -.0337
(.0136) (.0120) (.0171)
Married - dummy .0053 .0051 .0084
(.0092) (.0086) (.0143)
Male - dummy .0113 .0185 ** .0036
(.0095) (.0082) (.0154)
No. of children -.0125 *** -.0123 *** -.0115 *
(.0036) (.0030) (.0062)
Household labour income (000 euros) .0003 .0004 .0001
(.0004) (.0004) (.0007)
Self-employed parents - dummy .0392 *** 0465 ***
(.0067) (.0103)
Graduate parents - dummy .0062 -.0019
(.0191) (.0264)
District - dummy .0147 *
(.0088)
Absolute risk aversion -.0046
(.1208)
Household net wealth (000 euros) .00014 *** .00015 *** .00008 *
(.00003) (.00002) (.00005)
No. observations 6,846 8,176 2,057
Pseudo R2 0.0447 0.0370 0.0747
Period 1991-2002 1989-2002 1993-2002
Observed probability 0.0762 0.0736 0.0729
Estimated probability 0.0679 0.0668 0.0594
The sample is obtained considering in pairs di®erent waves of the SHIW (1991-93; 1993-95; 1995-98; 1998-00;
2000-2002). All households that in the ¯rst period are not entrepreneurs, according to the de¯nition Entre2,
are considered in the whole sample, pooled together. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the household
becomes an entrepreneur; equal to 0 if the household remains a wage earner. Year dummies and 20 regional
dummies are included. The personal characteristics refer to the member of the household who declares he
or she is an entrepreneur. In model 1 entrepreneurial ability is measured with a dummy equal to 1 if the
parents were self-employed and also with a measure of the parents' education; in model 2 entrepreneurial
ability is captured with a dummy equal to 1 if the household belongs to an industrial district; model 3 is
like model 1 with a measure of household risk aversion. Robust standard errors are in brackets; they are
adjusted for 95 clusters in provinces. * indicates signi¯cant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
37Table 4: The probability of starting a business: net wealth in quartiles
(pooled probit estimation - marginal e®ects)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age -.0103 *** -.0087 *** -.0027
(.0032) (.0027) (.0046)
Age squared .0001 *** .0001 *** .0000
(.0000) (.0000) (.0001)
High school - dummy -.0193 ** -.0164 ** -.0187 *
(.0074) (.0067) (.0094)
Graduate - dummy -.0053 .0006 -.0091
(.0112) (.0107) (.0149)
Unemployed - dummy -.0138 -.0196 -.0318
(.0135) (.0119) (.0176)
Married - dummy .0051 .0046 .0083
(.0091) (.0086) (.0144)
Male - dummy .0109 .0182 ** .0039
(.0093) (.0081) (.0150)
No. of children -.0123 *** -.0121 *** -.0108 *
(.0035) (.0030) (.0061)
Household labour income (000 euros) .0003 .0004 .0001
(.0004) (.0004) (.0007)
Self-employed parents - dummy .0392 *** 0471 ***
(.0067) (.0102)
Graduate parents - dummy .0061 -.0024
(.0187) (.0260)
District - dummy .0143 *
(.0087)
Absolute risk aversion -.0095
(.1185)
Household net wealth 1st quartile WN1 (000 euros) .00271 .00118 .00329
(.00183) (.00176) (.00275)
Household net wealth 2nd quartile WN2 (000 euros) .00080 *** .00070 *** .00079 **
(.00020) (.00018) (.00035)
Household net wealth 3rd quartile WN3 (000 euros) .00027 *** .00024 *** .00013
(.00010) (.00010) (.00016)
Household net wealth 4th quartile WN4 (000 euros) .00019 *** .00018 *** .00013 **
(.00003) (.00003) (.0001)
Wald test WN2=WN3 p-value .0017 .0011 0372
Wald test WN2=WN4 p-value .0012 .0012 .0492
Wald test WN3=WN4 p-value .3316 .4471 .9910
No. observations 6,846 8,176 2,057
Pseudo R2 0.0479 0.0397 0.0801
Period 1991-2002 1989-2002 1993-2002
Observed probability 0.0762 0.0736 0.0729
Estimated probability 0.0673 0.0663 0.0584
38Table 5: The probability of starting a business: instrumented net wealth
estimations run separately for households in di®erent quartiles of net wealth
(pooled probit estimation - marginal e®ects and coe±cients)
Variables Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
IV 1* IV 1* IV 2* IV 2*
H.hld wealth .00040 *** .00049 ***
[.00305] [.00366]
(.00054) (.00110)
H.hld wealth 1q .05431 .04496 **
WN1 [.55405] [.46942]
(.56621) (.23138)
H.hld wealth 2q .01332 * .00736 *
WN2 [.10213] [.05591]
(.05648) (.03251)
H.hld wealth 3q .00293 * -.00086
WN3 [.02365] [-.00685]
(.01373) (.02196)
H.hld wealth 4q .00070 *** .00049
WN4 [.00447] [.00313]
(.00131) (.00334)
H.hld wealth < median .00577 *** .00400 ***
WN B [.04923] [.03426]
(.01708) (.01080)
H.hld wealth > median .00050 *** .00018
WN A [.00353] [.00129]
(.00080) (.00222)
Wald test WN2=WN3 0.1773 0.0564
Wald test WN2=WN4 0.0838 0.0719
Wald test WN3=WN4 0.1648 0.4839
Wald test WN B=WN A 0.0075 0.0012
First-stage estimation IV 1* IV 1* IV 2* IV 2*
Test F on instrument





WN B .0000 .0000
WN A .0000 .0000
No. observations 6,849 6,849 6,835 6,835
Period 1991-2002 1991-2002 1991-2002 1991-2002
The sample is the same as in Table 3 for model 1. In the ¯rst row marginal e®ects are reported; coe±cients
are in square brackets and robust standard errors adjusted for 95 clusters in the provinces are in round
brackets. In model IV 1* the instrument for net wealth is the size of the house in square meters, while
in model IV 2* the instrument is the category of the house (there are 6 di®erent categories of house from
luxury to rural). Test F on instrument tests that the instrument is statistically signi¯cant in the ¯rst stage
regression for net wealth; P-value is reported. Year dummies and area dummies are included. H.hld means
household and q refers to quartile of wealth; household net wealth is expressed in 000 euros. * indicates
signi¯cant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
39Table 6: The probability of starting a business: some extensions
(pooled probit estimation - marginal e®ects)
Variables Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
enforcement no repeated obs young rationed
Age -.0100 *** -.0098 * -.0014 -.0101 ***
(.0032) (.0055) (.0181) (.0028)
Age squared .0001 *** .0001 .0000 .0001 ***
(.0000) (.0001) (.0000) (.0000)
High school -.0192 ** -.0413 *** -.0257 ** -.0195 ***
(.0073) (.0140) (.0124) (.0066)
Graduate -.0055 -.0240 .0305 -.0044
(.0111) (.0174) (.0257) (.0107)
Unemployed -.0158 -.0385 * -.0429 -.0161
(.0130) (.0183) (.0195) (.0143)
Married .0048 .0157 -.0437 ** .0064
(.0090) (.0169) (.0214) (.0099)
Male .0103 -.0005 .0286 * .0114
(.0093) (.0184) (.0138) (.0084)
No. of children -.0125 *** -.0086 -.0173 ** -.0126 ***
(.0035) (.0065) (.0069) (.0037)
H.hld labour income (000 euros) .0003 .0009 .0012 .0003
(.0004) (.0007) (.0008) (.0004)
Self-employed parents .0391 *** .0493 *** .0627 *** .0389 ***
(.0066) ( .0109) (.0137) (.0066)
Graduate parents .0058 -.0039 .0165 .0066
(.0186) (.0301) (.0328) (.0151)
WN1 (000 euros) .0290 ** .0023 .0041
(.0129) (.0032) (.0045)
WN2 (000 euros) .0051 *** .0011 *** .0016 **
(.0013) (.0004) (.0008)
WN3 (000 euros) .0022 *** .0004 ** .0002
(.0006) (.0002) (.0002)
WN4 (000 euros) .0008 *** .0003 *** .0002 **
(.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
WN1 *quantity recovered -.0004 **
(.0002)
WN2 *quantity recovered -.0001 ***
(.0000)
WN3 *quantity recovered -.0000 ***
(0.000)
WN4 *quantity recovered -.0000 ***
(.0000)
H.hld wealth * rationed R1 .0005 **
(.0002)
H.hld wealth * not rationed R2 .0001 ***
(.0000)
Wald test R1=R2 p-value 0.0950
No. observations 6,846 3,102 2,090 6,846
Pseudo R2 0.0512 0.0508 0.0936 0.0453
Period 1991-2002 1991-2002 1991-2002 1991-2002
Observed probability 0.0762 0.1099 0.0889 0.0762
Estimated probability 0.0666 0.0988 0.0702 0.0678
40Table 7: The size of the business and initial net wealth
(Heckman estimation)
Variables No. No. Value Value
employees employees business business
Age .1602 .1441 -.5534 -.6850
(.1499) (.1551) (2.654) (2.624)
Age squared -.0020 -.0018 .0129 .0145
(.0017) (.0017) (.0311) (.0308)
High school -.3441 -.3810 1.366 .9480
(.5660) (.5691) (8.111) (7.978)
Graduate -1.419 ** -1.509 ** -13.00 -14.04
(.6041) (.6218) (10.07) (9.878)
Married .8409 .7659 .2537 -.5130
(.5927) (.5945) (13.24) (13.08)
Male -.0581 -0272 13.50 ** 14.40 **
(.7083) (.7099) (6.621) (6.630)
H.hld labour income (000 euros) .0855 ** .0887 ** .5652 * .5923 *
(.0349) (.0350) (.3040) (.3108)
District - dummy .8583 .8045 7.428 6.972
(.6732) (.6769) (8.998) (8.803)
Household net wealth (000 euros) .0035 .0402
(.0030) (.0375)
WN1 (000 euros) .0224 .4270
(.1022) (1.797)
WN2 (000 euros) .0304 ** .3075
(.0148) (.2019)
WN3 (000 euros) .0099 .1036
(.0072) (.1059)
WN4 (000 euros) .0049 .0568
(.0033) (.0443)
Wald test WN2=WN3 p-value .1593 .2460
Wald test WN3=WN4 p-value .4425 .5684
Wald test WN2=WN4 p-value .0695 .1812
No. observations 8,177 8,177 8,170 8,170
No. uncensored observations 592 592 590 590
Period 1989-2002 1989-2002 1989-2002 1989-2002
Wald test of indepedent equations
p-value 0.0093 0.0076 0.0060 0.0089
The value of the business includes equipment and goodwill and the share of market value for active sharehold-
ers and partners. Year and area dummies are included; regional dummies for unreported selection equation
that is omitted as the coe±cients are similar to the ones presented in Tables 3 and 4. Robust standard errors
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